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Abstract—We consider the wiretap channel model under the
presence of a hybrid, half duplex adversary that is capable of
either jamming or eavesdropping at a given time. We analyzed the
achievable rates under a variety of scenarios involving different
methods for obtaining transmitter CSI. Each method provides
a different grade of information, not only to the transmitter on
the main channel, but also to the adversary on all channels.
Our analysis shows that main CSI is more valuable for the
adversary than the jamming CSI in both delay-limited and
ergodic scenarios. Similarly, in certain cases under the ergodic
scenario, interestingly, no CSI may lead to higher achievable
secrecy rates than with CSI.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic security has received a significant
attention recently. One mainstream direction has been on the
wireless transmission of confidential messages from a source
to a destination, in the presence of internal and/or external
eavesdroppers. Toward achieving that goal, the communicating
pair exploits the stochasticity and the asymmetry of wireless
channels between the communicating pair and the eavesdrop-
pers. A stochastic encoder at the transmitter makes use of
the available channel state information (CSI) in a way for the
mutual information leaked to the adversaries remain arbitrarily
small. It is designed in a way that, even when the adversaries
have access to the full CSI of the main channel, i.e., between
the transmitter and the receiver as well as the eavesdropper
channel, i.e., between the transmitter and itself, it still will
obtain an arbitrarily low rate of information on the message.
Likewise, the adversary relies on CSI to make decisions. For
instance, a half-duplex hybrid adversary, capable of jamming
or eavesdropping at a given time (but not both simultaneously)
decides between jamming vs. eavesdropping, based on the
available CSI.
The assumption that the adversaries have full CSI of
all channels is typical in the literature [1]-[3]. While this
assumption leads to robust systems in terms of providing
security as it makes no assumptions on the adversaries, it can
be too conservative in some cases. For example, to obtain
main CSI, an adversary relies on the same resource as the
transmitter: feedback from the legitimate receiver. Hence, from
the perspective of the receiver, there is a tradeoff between
revealing CSI and keeping it secret: If the legitimate receiver
chooses not to reveal CSI, it will sacrifice some achievable
rate of reliable communication, but the adversary will have
to make decisions under a higher uncertainty. In this paper,
we study the tradeoffs involving obtaining CSI. We ask the
questions, should a legitimate pair obtain CSI and if so, what
should be their strategy?
To that end, we focus on the system depicted in Figure 1.
We assume all three channels to be block fading. In each
block, based on the available CSI, the half-duplex adversary
can choose to do jamming at a fixed transmission power or
eavesdropping, but not both. Our objective is to maximize the
rate of reliable communication over the main channel, subject
to full equivocation [4] (weak secrecy) at the adversary. The
adversary can follow an arbitrary strategy in its choice of
jamming vs. eavesdropping at any given block. In the case
in which the receiver feeds back main CSI, it may do so
in two ways: directly by sending back the exact state of
the channel or by sending reverse pilots, trying to exploit
channel reciprocity (similar to [5]). While the former method
completely reveals the main CSI, it eliminates the possibility
of the adversary to learn the jammer CSI. On the other hand,
while the pilot feedback successfully hides the main CSI, it
enables the adversary to estimate the jammer CSI. In terms
of the secrecy encoding strategies, we address the possibilities
under two general scenarios: the ergodic and the delay-limited.
In the former case, one message is encoded across infinitely
many blocks and in the latter case, a separate message is
encoded over each block, to be decoded immediately. Thus,
in the delay-limited scenario, we also impose an additional
probabilistic constraint on the decoding and secrecy outage
events.
In the delay limited scenario, we show that by revealing the
main CSI, the receiver achieves a higher secrecy rate under
the outage constraint, compared to transmission with no CSI.
Furthermore, we show that main CSI is more valuable for
the adversary than the jamming CSI in both delay-limited and
ergodic scenarios. In the ergodic scenario, we observe that the
transmitter may not need the CSI to achieve higher secrecy
rates.
There is a recent research interest on hybrid adversaris.
In [7], the authors formulate the MIMO wiretap channel as
a two player zero-sum game in which the payoff function
is an achievable ergodic secrecy rate. The strategy of the
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Fig. 1. System Model
transmitter is to send the message in a full power or to
utilize some of the available power to produce artificial noise.
The conditions under which pure Nash equilibrium exists are
studied. In [6], the authors consider fast fading main and
eavesdropper channels and static jammer channel. Under this
channel configuration, they propose a novel encoding scheme
which is called block-Markov Wyner secrey encoding. In [8],
the authors introduce a pilot contamination attack in which the
adversary jams during the reverse training phase to prevent
the transmitter from estimating the main CSI correctly. As a
result, the transmitter incorrectly designs precoder which will
increase the signal strength at the adversary that eavesdrops
the main channel during the data transmission phase.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we first describe the system model. We then explain the
channel model and CSI feedback models. At the end of the
section, we explain the problem formulations. In Section III,
we present the results for both delay limited and ergodic
scenarios. In Section IV, we present our numerical results and
conclude the paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Channel Model
In this paper, we focus on a block fading channel model.
Time is divided into discrete blocks and there are N channel
uses in each block. Channel state is assumed to be constant
within a block and varies randomly from one block to the next.
We assume all parties are half-duplex, thus the adversary can
not jam and eavesdrop simultaneously.
The observed signals at the legitimate receiver and the
adversary in i-th block are as follows:
Y N (i) = Gm(i)X
N (i) +Gz(i)S
N
j (i)IJ(i) + S
N
m(i) (1)
ZN (i) = Ge(i)X
N (i)(1− IJ(i)) + SNe (i) (2)
where XN (i) is the transmitted signal, P is the transmission
power, Y N (i) is the signal received by the legitimate receiver,
ZN (i) is the signal received by the adversary, SNj (i), S
N
m(i),
and SNe (i) are noise vectors distributed as complex Gaus-
sian, CN(0, PjIN×N ), CN(0, IN×N ), and CN(0, IN×N ), re-
spectively, and Pj is the jamming power. Indicator function
IJ(i) = 1, if the adversary is in a jamming state in the
i-th block; otherwise IJ(i) = 0. Channel gains, Gm(i),
Ge(i), and Gz(i) are defined to be the independent com-
plex gains of transmitter-to-receiver channel, transmitter-to-
adversary channel, and adversary-to-receiver channel, respec-
tively (as illustrated in Figure 1). Associated power gains
are denoted with Hm(i) = |Gm(i)|2, He(i) = |Ge(i)|2,
and Hz(i) = |Gz(i)|2. We assume that channel reciprocity
principle is valid for all channels, i.e., reverse channels and
forward channels have identical gains. We also assume that
joint probability density function of instantaneous power gains,
fH(h), where H = [Hm(·) He(·) Hz(·)], is well defined and
known by all entities.
B. Methods for Obtaining CSI
The legitimate pair may choose to obtain main CSI or
communicate without it. We call the latter strategy the no
CSI case. If they choose to obtain main CSI, at the beginning
of each time block, the transmitter sends training symbols to
the legitimate receiver. In this paper, we ignore the overhead
associated with this training process. We assume that, using the
training symbols sent at the beginning of block i, the legitimate
receiver obtains perfect knowledge of Gm(i) and the adversary
obtains perfect knowledge of Ge(i).
Once the receiver observes main CSI, it uses two possible
methods for feeding back this information. The first one is
directly feeding back the observed channel state: the value of
Gm(i) is encoded at the receiver and sent to the transmitter
in a feedback packet. Thus, we call this feedback method
the packet feedback. We assume that the legitimate receiver
and the adversary both decode this packet successfully and
learn Gm(i). The second method is using pilot based CSI
feedback in which the receiver sends training symbols to the
transmitter. We call this second method the pilot feedback.
We assume that by using these reverse training symbols, the
legitimate transmitter obtains perfect knowledge of Gm(i) and
the adversary obtains the perfect knowledge of Gz(i). Thus,
in the first method, the adversary obtains the knowledge of
Gm(i), but not Gz(i), whereas the reverse is true in the second
method.
C. Adversary Model
The goal of the adversary is to minimize the achieved
secrecy rate. The strategy space of the adversary in each block
is binary: jamming or eavesdropping. The transmitter does
not observe the strategy of the adversary in any given block,
whereas we assume that the adversary knows the strategy of
the transmitter a priori.
From one block to the next, the adversary chooses its
strategy based on the transmitter’s strategy and the obtained
channel power gains1, i.e., he(i) for the no CSI case, he(i),
hm(i) for the packet feedback case, and he(i), hz(i) for the
pilot feedback case. We denote the vector of channel power
1The realizations of the random variables are represented by lower case
letters in the sequel.
gains observed by the adversary at the beginning of the ith
block with hA(i).
The secrecy level of a transmitted message is measured by
the equivocation rate at the adversary. The equivocation rate
at the adversary is defined as the entropy of the transmitted
message conditioned on the channel output and the available
CSI at the adversary. If the equivocation rate is equal to the
secrecy rate, the message is said to be transmitted with perfect
secrecy.
D. Encoding of Information
In our system, we consider two levels of encoding. At
the higher level, secrecy is realized Wyner code introduced
in [4]. There, Cs(Rm, Rs, NM) represents a Wyner code of
size 2NMRm that bears a confidential message set Ws =
{1, 2, . . . , 2NMRs}, where NM is the codeword length in
number of bits. A message, ws ∈ Ws is mapped to NMRm
bits by a secrecy encoder [4] and these NMRm bits are then
mapped to channel encoded bits at the lower level of encoding
using a sequence of codes, Ci(2NR(hm(i)), N), one for each
block i, 1 ≤ i ≤ M . Here, the code rate, R(hm(i)), is
chosen based on the main CSI, obtained at the transmitter.
The sequence of codewords is denoted with xNM ∈ XNM ,
and the decoder, φ(·) maps the received sequence, Y NM to
wˆ ∈W. The average error probability of the sequence of codes
{Ci} is denoted with the associated sequence PNMe . In this
paper, we focus on two scenarios as to how secrecy encoding
and channel encoding are applied: delay limited and ergodic.
1) Delay-Limited Scenario: In the delay-limited scenario,
the transmitter encodes a separate secret message, Ws(i) in
each block i. Consequently, we use a separate secrecy encoder
Cs(i) = Cs(Rm(i), Rs, N) for each block, where Rm(i)
is chosen to be identical to R(hm(i)) to meet the channel
rate. The channel encoder merely maps these NRm(i) bits
to N Gaussian random variables, XN , forming a Gaussian
codebook Ci(2NR(hm(i), N). For the delay-limited scenario,
we define the secrecy outage and connection outage events [3]
as:
I(XN ;ZN |he(i))
N
> R(hm(i))−Rs and (3)
I(XN ;Y N |hm(i))
N
< R(hm(i)), (4)
respectively, where XN ∼ CN(0, P IN×N )
2) Ergodic Scenario: In the ergodic scenario, the transmit-
ter has one secret message Ws and encodes it over M blocks
using the Cs(Rm, Rs, NM) encoder. In the ergodic scenario,
secrecy rate Rs is said to be achievable if, for any  > 0, there
exists sequence of channel codes {Ci} for which the following
are satisfied:
PNMe ≤  (5)
1
MN
H(Ws|ZMN ,hMA ) ≥ Rs −  (6)
for sufficiently large N and M and for any hMA ∈ AM such that
P [AM ] = 1. Here, we consider two possible channel encoding
strategies:
1. Encoding across blocks: We use this strategy in the
no main CSI case. In this strategy, the NMRm bits at the
output of the secrecy encoder is channel encoded via a single
C(2NMRm , NM) Gaussian codebook and the NM symbols
are transmitted over the channel over M blocks.
2. Block-by-block encoding: We use this strategy when
the main CSI is available. To utilize the main channel
knowledge, the transmitter chooses some h∗z and encodes
the information using a Gaussian codebook with the rate
R(hm(i)) = log
(
1 + Phm(i)1+Pjh∗z
)
over block i. With this choice,
the transmitted codeword will not be decoded successfully
if the adversary is in the jamming state and hz(i) > h∗z .
To handle this possibility, we use a plain ARQ strategy
in each block (similar to [9]). Transmissions that receive a
negative acknowledgement (NAK) are retransmitted until they
are decoded successfully.
E. Problem Formulation
One can notice that, in both the delay-limited and the
ergodic scenarios, we use a constant secrecy rate2 Rs. The goal
of the transmitter is to maximize the secrecy rate, Rs over the
strategy space of secrecy encoding and channel encoding rates.
To that end, we consider the worst case scenario, in which
the adversary perfectly tracks the strategy of the transmitter
in each block. Furthermore, since the transmitter does not
know the real state of the adversary, the strategy pair of
the transmitter should satisfy the constraint for any arbitrary
strategy of the adversary. Thus, we choose the secrecy rate
using:
R∗s = max
Rm(i),Rs
min
IJ (i)
Rs (7)
for all i in both the delay-limited and the ergodic scenarios,
subject to the following outage constraint in the delay-limited
scenario only:
lim
M→∞
1
M
M∑
i=1
IJ(i)IC(i) + (1− IJ(i))IS(i)IC(i) ≥ α (8)
with probability 1, where IC(i) and IS(i) are indicator func-
tions that take on a value 0 in case of a connection and a
secrecy outage, respectively. We evaluate R∗s under the no
CSI, packet feedback, and pilot feedback cases. Note that the
constraint enforces that the fraction of packets that are not in
the both secrecy outage and the connection outage should be
larger than a threshold as the number of blocks, M , goes to
infinity.
Note that, the reason why we focus on the specific encoding
strategies specified under delay limited and ergodic scenarios
in Section II-D is that, the solution, R∗S , of the maximin
problem stated in (7) is unknown [11].
2For the delay-limited case, it is constant over the entire sequence of Wyner
codes.
III. RESULTS
A. Delay Limited Scenario
The outage constraint in (8) is formulated as
C = lim
M→∞
1
M
M∑
i=1
IJ(i)Ilog
(
1+
PHm(i)
1+PjHz(i)
)
≥R(Hm(i))
+ (1− IJ(i))Ilog(1+PHe(i))≤R(Hm(i))−Rs
× Ilog(1+PHm(i))≥R(Hm(i)) (9)
Note that in (9), the secrecy outage event is represented with
log (1 + Phe(i)) > R(hm(i))−Rs and the connection outage
events are given as log
(
1 + Phm(i)1+Pjhz(i)
)
< R(hm(i)) and
log (1 + Phm(i)) < R(hm(i)).
Theorem 1. For the delay limited scenario, the solution of
(7), subject to constraint (9) leads to the following ordering
of the achievable rate with respect to the type of feedback:
RNo CSIs ≤ RPacket feedbacks ≤ RPilot Feedbacks (10)
The above theorem implies that main CSI, which is obtained
with packet feedback is more valuable for the adversary than
the jammer CSI, which is obtained with pilot feedback. We
now give an outline for the proof. The details of the proof can
be found in Section VI.
The Outline of Proof of Theorem 1: The basic idea is
to compare the feasible set of the problem (7) for three cases.
The feasible set is defined as
F = {(Rs, R(·)) : C ≥ α w.p. 1, ∀Ap} (11)
where Ap is the set of channel power gains, hA(i), such that
the adversary is in the jamming state if hA(i) ∈ Ap. The equiv-
alent form of (7) is as follows: R∗s = max(Rs,R(·))∈F Rs. We
observe that the solution to (7) is directly related to the size of
the feasible set. The strategy pair (Rs, R(·)) is the element of
the feasible set, F if Cmin = minAp C[(Rs, R(·))] ≥ α w.p. 1.
We can write Cmin for the no CSI and packet feedback cases
as follows:
CPacket Feedbackmin =
P
[
Rs + log (1 + PHe) ≤ R(Hm) ≤ log
(
1 +
PHm
1 + PjHz
)]
CNo CSImin =
P
[
Rs + log (1 + PHe) ≤ R ≤ log
(
1 +
PHm
1 + PjHz
)]
We can observe that FNo CSI ⊂ F Packet Feedback so we have
RNo CSIs ≤ RPacket feedbacks . By assuming the adversary is full-
duplex, we find a lower bound, C lower bound for Cmin at CSI
feedback cases. Then, we observe C lower bound = CPacket Feedbackmin
which shows CPacket Feedbackmin ≤ CPilot Feedbackmin and this concludes
the proof.
B. Ergodic Scenario
We first present a secrecy rate that is achievable under the
no CSI case.
Theorem 2. The achieved secrecy under no CSI is:
RNo CSIs =[
E
[
log
(
1 +
PHm
1 + PjHz
)
− log (1 + PHe)
]]+
(12)
The proof of (12) can be found at Section VII. Next, we
present an upper bound for the secrecy rates achieved with the
block-by-block encoding strategy.
Theorem 3. Under the block-by-block encoding strategy, the
achievable secrecy rate is upper bounded by
R+s = E
[
log
(
1 +
PHm
1 + PjHz
)
− log(1 + PHe)
]+
× P [Hz ≤ h∗z] (13)
To find this upper bound, we employ the following strategy.
When the transmitter receives a NAK signal, the transmitter
sends an independent group of bits on the next block instead of
retransmitting the previous packet [12]. In [12], the authors use
this scheme for the secret key sharing. The crucial observation
is that an upper bound for the achievable secret key rate is also
an upper bound for the achievable secrecy rates. The details of
the proof can be found at Section VIII. Note that with the plain
ARQ strategy described in Section II-D2, the achievable rate is
identical to the expression provided in (13), with P [Hz ≤ h∗z]
replaced with (P [Hz ≤ h∗z])2, and Hz in the expectation term
replaced with h∗z as shown in [9].
By comparing the upper bound given in Theorem 3, we
gain understanding on the performance of no CSI case. In
particular, whenever the achievable rate with the no CSI case
exceeds this bound, we know for sure that encoding across
blocks (no CSI) is preferable over block-by-block encoding
with CSI. The main difference between block-by-block en-
coding and encoding across blocks is that, in the former, the
unsuccessfully received packets are discarded, whereas in the
no CSI case, all the information received by the receiver is
used to decode the message. The set of parameters for which
this is the case is illustrated in Section IV in an example.
One can also write a general relationship between the
performance with packet feedback and pilot feedback:
Theorem 4. Any secrecy rate achievable with packet feedback
strategy is also achievable with pilot feedback strategy.
Theorem 4, shows that main CSI is more valuable for the
adversary than the jamming CSI in the ergodic scenario, as
was the case in the delay limited scenario. The proof can be
found at Section IX
IV. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
We first analyze the delay-limited case. We assume that both
main and eavesdropper channels are characterized by block
Rayleigh fading, where the main channel and eavesdropper
channel power gains follow an exponential distribution with a
mean 10 and 1, respectively3. We also assume the jamming
channel does not experience fading, where power gain is equal
to 1. The transmission power, P , and the jamming power,
Pj are identical and chosen to be 1. In Figure 2, we plot
the secrecy rate, Rs, as a function of the outage constraint
threshold, α under the no CSI, the packet feedback, and the
pilot feedback cases. The achievable rates in Figure 3 follow
the same ordering as given in Theorem (1).
Fig. 2. Delay Limited Scenario: Comparison of CSI feedback methods under
the outage constraint.
Next, we simulate the ergodic scenario and compare the two
strategies, encoding across blocks without CSI and block-by-
block encoding with packet CSI feedback. We used the same
power parameters as in the simulations for the delay-limited
case. All three channels are assumed to be block Rayleigh-
fading wtih E[Hz] = 1 We select the encoding parameter, h∗z
such that P [Hz ≤ h∗z] = 0.75.
In Figure 3, we illustrate the region where the encoding
across blocks outperforms the block-by-block encoding on the
(E[He], E[Hm]) space. The region to the left of the border,
given in the plot contains the set of (E[He], E[Hm]) for which
the encoding across blocks results in a higher secrecy rate.
The intuition behind this observation is that, when E[Hm] is
much larger than E[He], the positive operator inside the upper
bound, R+ loses its significance.
V. CONCLUSION
We consider the wiretap channel model under the presence
of half duplex adversary that is capable of either jamming or
eavesdropping at a given time. We analyzed the achievable
rates under a variety of scenarios involving different methods
for obtaining transmitter CSI. In particular, we considered no
CSI, CSI with packet based feedback, and CSI with pilot
based feedback. Each method provides a different grade of
information not only to the transmitter on the main channel,
but also to the adversary on all channels. We show for the
3Such a difference may occur in the cellular setting, when the receiver
is a base station with many antennas or in a wireless LAN setting, where
the receiver is located at a favorable position for reception, compared to an
external adversary.
Fig. 3. The region where encoding across blocks with no CSI outperforms
block-by-block encoding with packet feedback.
delay limited scenario that, the highest secrecy rate is achieved
with the pilot based feedback. Similarly, in the ergodic case,
we prove that the pilot-based CSI feedback outperforms the
packet-based CSI feedback, however interestingly, in certain
cases no CSI may lead to a higher achievable secrecy rates
than with CSI.
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Feasible set for the problem (7) is defined to be
F = {(Rs, R(·)) : C ≥ α, ∀Ap} (14)
where Ap is the set of channel power gains such that the
adversary is in the jamming state if hA(i) ∈ Ap. We have the
following lemma.
Lemma 5. If F 6= ∅, the solution to (7) is identical for all
strategies of the adversary.
Proof: The equivalent form of (7) is as follows:
R∗s = max
(Rs,R(·))∈F
Rs (15)
As seen from (15), R∗s does not depend on strategy of the
adversary.
However, the size of feasible set directly depends on the
CSI feedback scheme. From (15), we can see that the solution
to (7) is directly proportional with the size of the feasible set.
In the rest of the proof, we will use this observation to show
the ordering.
Lemma 6. RNo CSIs ≤ RPacket Feedbacks
Proof: In the no feedback case, constraint term (9) is
reduced to
C = lim
M→∞
1/M
M∑
i=1
IJ(i)Ilog
(
1+
PHm(i)
1+PjHz(i)
)
≥R
+ (1− IJ(i))Ilog(1+PHe(i))≤R−RsIlog(1+PHm(i))≥R (16)
= lim
M→∞
1/M
M∑
i=1
IHe(i)∈ApIlog
(
1+
PHm(i)
1+PjHz(i)
)
≥R
+ IHe(i)6∈ApIlog(1+PHe(i))≤R−RsIlog(1+PHm(i))≥R (17)
= E
[
IHe∈ApIlog
(
1+ PHm1+PjHz
)
≥R
+IHe 6∈ApIlog(1+PHe)≤R−RsIlog(1+PHm)≥R
]
, w.p. 1 (18)
=
∫
he
E
[
I
log
(
1+ PHm1+PjHz
)
≥RIHe∈Ap
+ Ilog(1+PHe)≤R−RsIlog(1+PHm)≥RIHe /∈Ap | He = he
]
fHe(he) dhe, w.p. 1 (19)
=
∫
he
E
[
I
log
(
1+ PHm1+PjHz
)
≥R
]
Ihe∈Ap
+ E[Ilog(1+PHm)≥R]Ilog(1+Phe)≤R−RsIhe /∈Ap
fHe(he) dhe, w.p. 1 (20)
where (17) follows from the fact that we have IJ(i) =
IHe(i)∈Ap since the adversary only knows the instantaneous
power gain of the eavesdropper channel, (18) follows from the
strong law of large numbers theorem and (20) follows from
the independence of He, Hm, and Hz .
A∗p set that minimizes C is as follows:
A∗p = {he : log (1 + Phe) ≤ R−Rs} (21)
The minimized C for a given rate pair (Rs, R) is
CNo CSI =
P
[
Rs + log (1 + PHe) ≤ R ≤ log
(
1 +
PHm
1 + PjHz
)]
Feasible set for the transmitter for the no CSI feedback case
is as follows
FNo CSI = {(Rs, R) : CNo CSI ≥ α} (22)
We now show that FNo CSI ⊂ F Packet Feedback. For the packet
feedback case, channel encoding rate is a function of the main
CSI, Hm. The adversary knows the instantaneous power gains
of the eavesdropping channel and the main channel. Constraint
term in (9) is reduced to
C = lim
M→∞
1/M
M∑
i=1
IJ(i)Ilog
(
1+
PHm(i)
1+PjHz(i)
)
≥R(Hm(i))
+ (1− IJ(i))Ilog(1+PHe(i))≤R(Hm(i))−Rs
Ilog(1+PHm(i))≥R(Hm(i)) (23)
= lim
M→∞
1/M
M∑
i=1
I(Hm(i),He(i))∈ApIlog
(
1+
PHm(i)
1+PjHz(i)
)
≥R(Hm(i))
+ I(Hm(i),He(i)) 6∈ApIlog(1+PHe(i))≤R(Hm(i))−Rs
Ilog(1+PHm(i))≥R(Hm(i)) (24)
= E
[
IHm,He∈ApIlog
(
1+ PHm1+PjHz
)
≥R(Hm)
+IHm,He 6∈ApIlog(1+PHe)≤R(Hm)−RsIlog(1+PHm)≥R
]
,
w.p. 1 (25)
=
∫
hm,he
E
[
I
log
(
1+ Phm1+PjHz
)
≥R(hm)
]
Ihm,he∈Ap
+ Ilog(1+Phe)≤R(hm)−RsIlog(1+Phm)≥R(hm)Ihm,he /∈Ap
fHe(he)fHm(hm) dhedhm, w.p. 1 (26)
where (24) follows from the facet that IJ(i) =
IHm(i),He(i)∈Ap since the adversary knows both the
instantaneous power gain of the eavesdropper channel and
the main channel. (25) follows from the strong law of large
numbers theorem and (26) follows from the independence of
He, Hm, and Hz . A∗p set that minimizes C is as follows:
A∗p = {hm, he : log (1 + Phe) ≤ R(hm)−Rs}⋃
{hm, he : log (1 + Phm) ≤ R(hm)} (27)
When we combine (26) and (27), the minimized can be
CPacket Feedback written as
CPacket Feedback =
P
[
Rs + log (1 + PHe) ≤ R(Hm) ≤ log
(
1 +
PHm
1 + PjHz
)]
.
Feasible set for the transmitter for the packet feedback case is
as follows
F Packet Feedback = {(Rs, R(·)) : CPacket Feedback ≥ α} (28)
It is easy to see that FNo CSI ⊂ F Packet Feedback then we have
RNo CSIs ≤ RPacket Feedbacks .
Lemma 7. RPacket Feedbacks ≤ RPilot Feedbacks
Proof: We will show that for any given (Rs, R(·)),
CPacket Feedback is a lower bound for (9) in the channel feedback
cases. Constraint (9) can be written as
C = lim
M→∞
1/M
M∑
i=1
[
1− IHm(i),He(i),Hz(i)∈O
]
(29)
where
O = {hm(i), he(i), hz(i) : IJ(i)Ilog(1+ Phm(i)
1+Pjhz(i)
)
≤R(hm(i)) = 1}⋃
{hm(i), he(i), hz(i) : IE(i)Ilog(1+Phe(i))≥R(hm(i))−Rs = 1}⋃
{hm(i), he(i), hz(i) : IE(i)Ilog(1+Phm(i))≤R(hm(i)) = 1}
(30)
Constraint C decreases as the siz of set O increases. Let’s
define an upper bound for O:
OUpper Bound
= {hm(i), he(i), hz(i) : Ilog(1+ Phm(i)
1+PjHz(i)
)
≤R(hm(i)) = 1}⋃
{hm(i), he(i), hz(i) : Ilog(1+Phe(i))≥R(hm(i))−Rs = 1}⋃
{hm(i), he(i), hz(i) : Ilog(1+Phm(i))≤R(hm(i)) = 1} (31)
where IJ(i) = IE(i) = 1,∀i ∈ N. Then, we find a lower
bound for C by putting OUpper Bound in (29):
CLower Bound
= lim
M→∞
M∑
i=1
I
log
(
1+
PHm(i)
1+PjHz(i)
)
≥R(Hm(i))≥log(1+PHe(i))+Rs
= CPacket CSI (32)
Since CLower Bound = CPacket Feedback, we have FLower Bound =
FPacket Feedback ⊂ FPilot Feedback.
VII. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We employ the encoding across block strategy explained
in Section II-D, where Rm , E
[
log
(
1 + PHm1+PjHz
)]
. If
Rm < E
[
log
(
1 + PHm1+PjHz
)]
, the adversary prevents the
reliable communication by jamming at every block. Note
that in no CSI case, the adversary only obtains he(i) so
equivocation rate is defined as H(W |Z
NM ,hMe )
NM . Equivocation
analysis for the encoding across block is as follows.
H(W |ZNM , hMe )
= H(W,XNM |ZNM , hMe )−H(XNM |ZNM ,W, hMe )
= H(XNM |ZNM , hMe ) +H(W |XNM , ZNM , hMe )
−H(XNM |ZNM ,W, hMe )
≥ H(XNM |ZNM , hMe ) +H(XNM |ZNM ,W, hMe )
= H(XNM |hMe )− I(XNM , ZNM |hMe )
+H(XNM |ZNM ,W, hMe )
(a)
= MNRm − I(XNM , ZNM |hMe )
−H(XNM |ZNM ,W, hMe )
≥MNRm −N
M∑
i=1
I(XN (i), ZN (i)|he(i))
−H(XNM |ZNM ,W, hMe )
≥MNRm −N
M∑
i=1
log(1 + Phe(i))
−H(XNM |ZNM ,W, hMe )
where (a) follows from the fact that codeword XNM is
uniformly distributed over a set of size 2NMRm . We continue
with the following steps.
H(W |ZNM , hMe )
NM
≥ Rm −
∑M
i=1 log(1 + Phe(i))
M
− H(X
NM |ZNM ,W, hMe )
NM
(b)
≥ Rm − E [log(1 + PHe)]− 1
− H(X
NM |ZNM ,W, hMe )
NM
,
(c)
≥ Rm − E [log(1 + PHe)]− 1 − 2
= Rs − ,
where  = 1 + 2. Here, (b) is satisfied for any 1 > 0 and
hMe ∈ AM with Pr[AM ] = 1 and M ≥M(1) since
lim
M→∞
1
M
M∑
i=1
log(1 + PHe(i)) = E [log(1 + PHe)]
with probability 1, (c) follows from the Fano’s inequality.
Let’s define Re , Rm −Rs and PNMe , P [XNM 6= XˆNM ]
where XˆNM = g(ZNM , hMe ,W ) is the estimation of the
codeword XNM .
H(XNM |ZNM ,W, hMe )
NM
≤ PNMe Re +
H(PNMe )
NM
(33)
≤ 2 (34)
Here, any 2 > 0, (34) is satisfied for sufficiently high N and
M . The reason is that since Re = I(XN , ZN |He), PNMe → 0
for the sequence of codes (2NMRe , Re) as M →∞.
VIII. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We first show that if Rs is an achievable secrecy rate
under the packet feedback strategy, we have for any  >
0, 1NMH(W |ZNM , HMm , HMe ) ≥ Rs − ,∀N ≥ N(),∀M ≥
M(). Note that here, the message W is conditioned on
random vectors, HMe and H
M
m .
1
NM
H(W |ZNM,HMm , HMe ) (35)
=
∫
AM
1
NM
H(W |ZNM,hMM , hMe )fHMm ,HMe (hMm , hMe ) dhMm dhMe
≥
∫
AM
(Rs − )fHMm ,HMe (hMm , hMe ) dhMm dhMe (36)
= Rs −  (37)
where AM is the set defined in Section II-D2. Here, (36)
follows from the definition of achievability, and (37)follows
from the fact that P [AM ] = 1. We consider the following
case for the rest of the proof. When the transmitter receives
a NACK signal, on the next block, the transmitter sends
an independent group of bits instead of retransmitting the
previous packet [12]. In [12], the authors use this scheme for
the secret key sharing. The crucial observation is that an upper
bound for an achievable secret key rate is also an upper bound
for achievable secrecy rates.
We define index set F that contains the indexes of blocks
on which the transmitted codeword is successfully decoded.
Suppose that size of F is M ′, n′ , NM ′, and n , NM . We
now prove that 1nH(W |Zn, HMm , HMe ) ≤ R+s as n→∞.
H(W |Zn, HMm , HMe )
(a)
≤ H(W |Zn, HMm , HMe )
−H(W |Zn, Y n, HMm , HMz , HMe ) + nδn
(b)
= H(W |Zn′ , HM ′m , HM
′
e )
−H(W |Zn′ , Y n′ , HM ′m , HM
′
z , H
M ′
e ) + nδn
= I(W ;Y n
′
, Hn
′
z |Zn
′
, HM
′
m , H
M ′
e ) + δn
(c)
≤ I(Xn′ ;Y n′ , HM ′z |Zn
′
, HM
′
m , H
M ′
e ) + δn
= I(Xn
′
;HM
′
z |Zn
′
, HM
′
m , H
M ′
e )
+ I(Xn
′
;Y n
′ |Zn′ , HM ′m , HM
′
e , H
M ′
z ) + nδn
(d)
= I(Xn
′
;Y n
′ |Zn′ , HM ′m , HM
′
e , H
M ′
z )
(e)
=
M∑
i=1
I(XN (i);Y N (i)|ZN (i), Hz(i), Hm(i), He(i))I(i)
+ nδn
(f)
≤
M∑
i=1
NE
[
log
(
1 +
PHm
1 + PjHz
)
− log(1 + PHe)
]+
I(i)
+ nδn
where I(i) = IHz(i)≤h∗z . Here, (a) follows from Fano’s
inequality (b) follows from the independent choice of the code-
word symbols transmitted in each block that does not allow the
eavesdropper to benefit from the observations corresponding
to the previous NACKed blocks, (c) results from the data
processing inequality, (d) follows from the independence of
Xn
′
and HM
′
z , (e) follows from [2], and (f) follows from [10].
1
n
H(W |Zn, HMm , HMe ) (38)
≤ E
[
log
(
1 +
PHm
1 + PjHz
)
− log(1 + PHe)
]+
× 1
M
M∑
i=1
I(i) + δn (39)
Re
(g)
≤ αE
[
log
(
1 +
PHm
1 + PjHz
)
− log(1 + PHe)
]+
(g) follows from the fact that δn → 0 as N,M →∞ and from
the ergodicity of channels such that 1M
∑M
i=1 I(i)→ P [Hz ≤
h∗z] as M →∞.
IX. PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Suppose that Rs is a secrecy rate achieved with the packet
based strategy and n , NM . Notice that the equivoca-
tion rates for the pilot and packet feedbacks are defined
as 1nH(W |Zn, hMe ) and 1nH(W |Zn, hMe , hMm ), respectively.
Since Rs is an achievable rate with the packet based strat-
egy, by definition, for any  > 0 there exists N() and
M() such that for N ≥ N() and M ≥ M(), we have
1
nH(W |Zn, hMe , hMm ) ≥ Rs − , ∀(hMe , hMm ) ∈ AM with
P (AM ) = 1.
We define AM (hMe ) = {hMm : (hMm , hMe ) ∈ AM}.
Since HMm and H
M
e are independent random vectors and
P [(HMm , H
M
e ) ∈ AM ] = 1, we have P [HMm ∈ AM (hMe )] =
1,∀hMe ∈ AM . To observe that
1 =
∫
AM
fHMm ,HMe (h
M
m , h
M
e ) dh
M
m dh
M
e (40)
=
∫
hMe
fHMe (h
M
e )
∫
hMmAM (h
M
e )
fHMm (h
M
m ) dh
M
m dh
M
e (41)
=
∫
hMe
P [Hm ∈ AM (hMe )]fHMe (hMe ) dhMe = 1 (42)
We can see that P [Hm ∈ AM (hMe )] = 1, ∀hMe ∈ E such
that P [E] = 1. We now prove the lemma with following
inequalities.
1
n
H(W |Zn, hMe )
(a)
≥ 1
n
H(W |Zn, hMe , HMm ) (43)
=
∫
AM (hMe )
1
n
H(W |Zn, hMe , hMm )fHMm (hMm ) dhMm (44)
(b)
≥
∫
AM (hMe )
(Rs − )fHMm (hMm ) dhMm (45)
(c)
= Rs − , ∀hMe ∈ E with P [E] = 1. (46)
(a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces the en-
tropy, (b) follows from the fact that since hMm ∈ AM (hMe ),
(hMm , h
M
e ) ∈ AM , and (c) follows from the fact that P [Hm ∈
AM (h
M
e )] = 1.
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